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Political Authority: Its Collectivist Structure and Juridical Ground 
By Stefan Sciaraffa (McMaster University) 
Many contemporary political philosophers distinguish between an institution’s 
political authority and its political legitimacy. Per this distinction, an institution has political 
authority only if its public is bound by a political obligation to follow the institution’s 
directives, where this obligation entails that the institution’s directives are substantial moral 
content-independent reasons for the members of its public. By contrast, an institution’s 
political legitimacy is its moral liberty (1) to prescribe duties to its public and (2) to apply 
sanctions and incentives to secure its public’s compliance with those prescriptions.1  
Among those who accept the just described framework, there are two main camps. 
The first queries the conditions in which an institution would enjoy political authority and 
political legitimacy as described above. A second camp includes Joseph Raz and the many 
theorists he has influenced. This camp pays little heed to the question of political legitimacy, 
focusing their inquiries instead on the conditions in which an institution would have political 
																																																								
1 For recent articulations of this distinction (allowing for some differences in terminology), 
see Christopher Wellman (2001) “Toward a Liberal Theory of Political Obligation”, Ethics 
111: 735-59, 741 (see his fn. 8 for references to yet earlier articulations), Allen Buchanan 
(2002) “Political Legitimacy and Democracy”, Ethics 112:689-719, 689-90; David Estlund 
(2008) Democratic Authority, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 41, and; Michael Huemer 
(2013) The Problem of Political Authority, New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 69. Although his 
terminology is particularly idiosyncratic, A. John Simmons also observes this same basic 
distinction. See e.g., (2001) Justification and Legitimacy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
137.  
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authority. Moreover, this set of theorists insists on a slightly more complex account of 
political authority. On this account, A possesses political authority over B only insofar as A’s 
directives are both substantial moral content-independent reasons and exclusionary reasons 
for B (i.e. second-order reasons for B not to act for at least some of her reasons).2 I refer to 
these camps’ rival accounts of political authority as the simple view and the Razian account, 
respectively.  
Here, I argue against the simple view and the Razian account, and I argue for an 
alternative collectivist conception of political authority. The paper’s core argument is 
threefold. First, the Razian analysis of political authority rests on a key insight about the 
distinctively preemptive normative force of authoritative directives. Second, a key failing of 
the simple view is its failure to appreciate this insight. And third, the Razian account 
mistakenly characterizes preemption and, hence, political authority as a relationship in which 
the authority performs a deliberative function for individual subjects rather than for a 
collective considered as a whole. Hence, the Razian account should be rejected in favor of a 
conception of authority that construes preemption in this latter collectivist sense. This 
argument proceeds in a number of steps. 
In the paper’s first section, I explain the basis of the Razian account’s key insight 
about the preemptive force of authoritative directives—namely, the pretheoretical datum 
that Raz refers to as “the saying that in accepting authority we surrender our judgment to the 
authority.” Moreover, I explain the connection between this insight and the subsequent 
																																																								
2 For a brief defense of this exclusive focus, see John Tasioulas (2010) “The Legitimacy of 
International Law”, in The Philosophy of International Law, edited by Samantha Besson and John 
Tasioulas, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 97-99  
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Razian analysis of authority. I also argue that simple view theorists have good reason not to 
incorporate the Razian account of preemption into their analysis.  
In section two, I explicate the collectivist conception of preemption and authority. 
That is, I explicate the idea that an authority plays a deliberative role for a collective as whole 
rather than for individual persons. I then argue that a key failing of the simple view is its 
failure to incorporate the collectivist analysis of preemption.  
In section three, I employ the collectivist conception as a guide for refining and 
improving upon extant functionalist accounts of the grounds of political authority. The 
resulting Normal Functionalist Justification Thesis (NFJT) is the juridical ground mentioned 
in this paper’s title.  
The fourth section sets out my main argument against the Razian account of 
authority. Stated briefly, I argue that that Razian account of authority leads to perverse 
implications about the scope of institutions’ political authority and that these implications 
are emblematic of a deeper failing. Namely, the Razian account specifies the limits of 
authority in terms of considerations that would justify its playing a deliberative role for 
individual members of a collective rather than for the collective as whole.  
In the fifth and final section, I briefly discuss two issues in contemporary political 
and legal theory that the collectivist conception of authority and its juridical ground promises 
to reframe and clarify. As I argue, the collectivist conception reveals a non-parochial kernel 
of truth at the heart of A. John Simmons’s storied particularity requirement, and it promises 
to guide legal officials’ inquiries into the authoritative bases of their legal decisions. 
Irrespective of the success of my argument, I hope to call attention to the fact that 
heretofore few theorists other than Raz have offered sustained and careful analyses of the 
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preemptive normative character of authoritative directives.3 Moreover, I hope to illustrate 
that the analysis of preemption has far-reaching implications for further inquiry into the 
political authority and political legitimacy of institutions and thereby to convince the reader 
of the importance of assessing the comparative merit of alternatives to the Razian analysis of 
authoritative preemption.  
 
1. Two Conceptions of Political Authority  
 Put in terms of the philosophical vernacular that H.L.A. Hart invented, A has 
political authority over B only insofar as A’s directives are content-independent reasons for 
B.4 Per Hart’s design, this notion is a useful tool for describing one aspect of the distinctive 
normative force that a political authority claims for its directives—namely, that the directives 
are in their own right a reason for the subject to act as directed. More carefully stated, a 
content-independent reason to phi is a reason of the following form: An agent intends for 
the subject to phi.5 Thus, the notion of a content-independent reason enables the theorist to 
																																																								
3 Stephen Perry’s (1987) “Judicial Obligation, Precedent and the Common Law”, 7 Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies: 215 could be construed as a defense and applications of an 
alternative to Raz’s analysis of surrender of judgment. Also, David Enoch offers a friendly 
reworking and refinement of Raz’s analysis of preemption under the name of quasi-
exclusionary reasons in his (2014) “Authority and Reason-Giving”, Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 89: 296-332.  
4 See H.L.A. Hart (1982) Essays on Bentham, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 254-255. 
5 See Enoch (2014) for a similar account of this aspect of authoritative directives’ normative 
character, but under the heading of robust reasons rather than content-independent reasons.  
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distinguish ordinary practical reasons that typically inform agents’ intentions about their own 
or others’ actions from the content-independent reasons that such intentions supply in their own 
right.   
 Most contemporary theorists of political authority (including proponents of the 
simple view and those influenced by Raz) would agree that a political authority’s directives 
are not merely content-independent reasons; they are substantial moral content-independent 
reasons. Once again, we can look to Hart for further details about this widely acknowledged 
aspect of the directives of political authority.  
Hart holds that whereas a gunman’s demands oblige their addressees, laws purport to 
obligate theirs.6 Accordingly, we can distinguish between obliging and obligating content-
independent reasons. A directive is an obliging content-independent reason insofar as the 
basis of its content-independent force is the sanctioning or (I would add) incentive-giving 
power of its source. By contrast, a directive is an obligating content-independent reason only insofar 
as its grounds are considerations of substantial moral importance other than the threat of 
sanction or the promise of rewards. Moreover, by dint of its substantial moral grounds, an 
obligating content-independent reason is a weighty defeasible requirement,7 and, hence, it is 
dispositive in a broad range of circumstances. As I understand it here, the content-
independent reason that figures in the simple view and the Razian account is a Hartian 
obligating content-independent reason.  																																																								
6 See HLA Hart (1994) The Concept of Law, 2nd ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 80. 
7 Cf. Joshua Gert (2004) Brute Rationality: Normativity and Human Action, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
for a cogent discussion and defense of the distinction between reasons that require and reasons that merely 
permit.  
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1.1 The Razian Analysis of Authority 
 As noted in the introduction, the Razian account of political authority adds a further 
element to the simple view, for it holds that in addition to constituting obligating content-
independent reasons, the directives of a political authority are exclusionary reasons for their 
subjects.8 Raz’s argument relies on a methodological commitment that I (and other theorists, 
e.g., Hart, as suggested above) share. Namely, Raz seeks to provide an account of authority 
that reflects the understanding that animates the behavior of those who participate in 
relations of political authority.9  
In keeping with the just described methodological commitment, Raz’s account of 
political authority rests on various pretheoretical observations of the behavior and attitudes 
of those who participate in relations of authority. A key observation in this vein is that the 
directives of political authorities are widely taken to provide reasons that qualitatively differ 
from those that requests provide. However, as Raz further notes, requests are content-
independent reasons.10 Moreover, I would add that they are obligating content-independent 
reasons. For example, as Stephen Darwall would agree, a person’s demand that I remove my 
																																																								
8 See Joseph Raz (1979) The Authority of Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 11-16. See 
also Leslie Green (1990), The Authority of the State, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 41-42. 
9 See Joseph Raz (2006) Between Authority and Interpretation, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
134. 
10 See Joseph Raz (1979), 11-15 and (1986) The Morality of Freedom, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 35-37. 
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foot from atop hers would be in itself a weighty moral reason for me to remove my foot.11 
In a similar vein, the requests or demands made by one’s counterparts in any number of 
important relationships, such as friendships, marriages, filial relationships, and so on, are also 
reasons of this kind. Thus, as Raz concludes, in addition to their obligating content-
independent force, authoritative directives must bear yet further normative features that 
distinguish them from requests and demands of the sort just described.  
Raz links the distinctive normative character of authoritative directives to “the saying 
that in accepting authority we surrender our judgment to the authority.”12 Raz illustrates this 
truth by way of the following example: 
A man who orders someone else does not regard his order as merely another reason 
to be added to the balance by which the addressee will determine what to do. He 
intends the addressee to take his order as a reason on which to act regardless of 
whatever other conflicting reasons exists….13  
Raz’s claim is that whereas requests are generally regarded as content-independent reasons 
that weigh in the balance against other reasons, the fact that an authority has issued a 
																																																								
11 See Stephen Darwall (2010) “Authority and Reasons: Exclusionary and Second-Personal”, 
Ethics 120: 257-78, 262. For a discussion in which the affinities between Darwall’s idea of a 
second-personal reason and the idea of a content-independent reason are particularly evident 
see Darwall (2006) “The Value of Autonomy and Autonomy of the Will,” Ethics 116: 263-84, 
272-77. 
12 Raz (2006), 142. See also Raz (1986), 38-42. See also Darwall (2010), 272 and Enoch 
(2014) for recent endorsements of the surrender of judgment pretheoretical datum. 
13 Raz, The Authority of Law, 14-15. 
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directive is generally regarded not only as a reason for acting as directed but also as a reason 
reasons not to act for (i.e. to exclude) at least some of the reasons against conforming to the 
directive.14  
To put the just described distinction in terms that Raz coined, the feature that 
distinguishes authoritative directives from other content-independent reasons (e.g., requests) 
is that they are preemptive, which for Raz means that they are both content-independent 
reasons and exclusionary reasons. As Razian theorists sometimes put it, authoritative 
directives exclude and replace their subjects’ reasons. 
 
1.2 The Razian Critique of the Simple View and a Rejoinder 
We can distinguish two distinct but interrelated lines of criticism that Razian 
theorists marshal against the simple view. 15 First, the Razian theorist criticizes the simple 
view’s failure to note the exclusionary force of authoritative directives, and, hence, its failure 
to reflect such directives’ distinctive preemptive character. Second, the Razian theorist argues 
that the simple view’s inadequate characterization of the structure of relations of authority 
impedes further inquiry into the grounds that might justify relations of political authority, for 
the simple view theorist fails to appreciate that a political institution’s directives are 
preemptive (and hence authoritative) only under very particular conditions. To wit, simple 
																																																								
14 See Raz (1986), 41-42. 
15 See e.g., the criticisms of Buchanan’s account of institutional legitimacy in Tasioulas 
(2010), 97-99. As is well-known, Raz’s famed Normal Justification Thesis is his account of 
the normal way to establish that an authority’s directives are content-independent and 
exclusionary reasons for a subject. See Raz (1986), 53. 
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view theorists misguidedly consider many candidate grounds of political authority, such as 
the duty of fair play, the natural duty to support just institutions, associative obligations, 
consent, and a political institution’s capacity to coordinate its citizens’ important collective 
efforts or its democratic pedigree, to name just a few, without assessing whether these 
considerations would ground the exclusionary and, hence, the preemptive force of the state’s 
directives.16   
Although proponents of the simple view have surprisingly little to say explicitly in 
response to the foregoing Razian line of criticism, they have a powerful rejoinder ready to 
hand. To see this rejoinder, consider first the following two conditions characteristic of most 
any contemporary political community. The first is that such a community is typically bound 
together in part by institutions that prescribe and enforce frameworks of rights and duties 
for the community’s members. The second is deep and widespread disagreement among the 
community’s members about these rights and duties.  
In such circumstances, whether the relevant political institution’s directives are 
substantial moral content-independent reasons is a highly important question. Its answer 
marks the difference between a situation in which the threat of sanction is the main reason 
for an institution’s subjects to conform to the many directives that they find disagreeable and 
one in which there are also substantial moral content-independent reasons to comply with 
those directives despite objections to their merits. In short, the answer to this question 
marks the difference between subjugation and at least the possibility of justified dutiful 
obedience.  
																																																								
16 See e.g., Wellman (2001), Buchanan (2002), Huemer, The Problem of Political Authority, and 
A. John Simmons (2005). 
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 The rejoinder to the Razian critique of the simple view is that although it would be 
of great moment to learn whether or not an institution’s directives are obligating content-
independent reasons, the urgency of whether such directives are also exclusionary reasons 
pales in comparison. Thus, the simple view rather than the Razian account of political 
authority is the better frame for inquiry into the grounds of relations of political authority, 
for it directs the theorist’s attention to the morally significant aspect of relations of political 
authority.  
 
2. The Collectivist Conception of Authority 
The just described rejoinder generates a puzzle for the Razian account of political 
authority. If, as this rejoinder claims, the exclusionary force of an authority’s directives is a 
morally unimportant complement to its directives’ obligating content-independent force, 
why do political institutions insist that their directives are preemptive and hence, per the 
Razian analysis of preemption, both obligating content-independent reasons and 
exclusionary reasons?  
Many complex human practices are fraught with normative commitments that persist 
only by dint of institutional or cultural inertia. Thus, the puzzle about the motivation of 
preemption-claiming institutions does not amount to a decisive argument against the Razian 
analysis of preemption. That said, this puzzle is an occasion to consider the alternative 
analysis that does not saddle participants in authority relations with such undermotivated 
normative commitments—namely, the collectivist conception that I now explicate. 
From my own introspective and observational perch, I would put the pretheoretical 
idea of preemption as follows: There are certain decisions about how I (and others as well) 
must act that are for the relevant authority (e.g., perhaps a court, legislature, managerial 
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committee, department head, or coach) rather than me (or those others) to make. In this 
same vein, Stephen Darwall has recently endorsed Raz’s formulation of this pretheoretical 
idea that holds that authorities remove certain decisions from their subjects.17   
I rehearse the foregoing formulations of the surrender of judgment idea because they 
are highly suggestive of Raz’s key insight about relations of authority. Namely, in such 
relationships, there is a mutually acknowledged division of labor in which one party, the 
authority, plays a deliberative role and the subject parties play the complementary executive 
role.18   
The collectivist conception of preemption and authority rests on the premise that 
Raz’s insight is the foundation on which any adequate analysis of authority must rest; 
however, it further holds that the subsequent Razian analysis of preemption and authority 
conflates levels of analysis. That is, from the perspective of the collectivist conception, the 
Razian account mistakenly holds that A has political authority over B only insofar as B has 
reasons that require her to allow A to perform the deliberative role for her as an individual 
(i.e., B must allow A’s directives to exclude and replace some of her reasons). Rather, per the 
collectivist conception, A has political authority over B insofar as B and the other members 
of the relevant group have reasons that require them to allow B to play a deliberative role for 
that group as a whole.  
																																																								
17 See Darwall (2010), 272. Darwall favorably cites Joseph Raz (1990), 193 for this 
proposition. 
18 See e.g., Joseph Raz (1994) Ethics in the Public Domain, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
203-08. 
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More pointedly, for the collectivist, it is a mistake to hold that allowing an institution 
to perform a deliberative role for the group as a whole entails allowing it to play this role for 
each member of the group individually. Accordingly, as the following collectivist account of 
preemption and political authority illustrates, for an individual to accept that A’s directives 
ought to be allowed to play a deliberative role for the group as a whole does not entail that 
she must accept that A’s directives are exclusionary reasons for her or any other member of 
the group. 
The Collectivist Conception of Authority: A has authority over group G only if 
there is a non-empty set of directives such that should A issue any of them, for each 
member of G: (a) the directive would be an obligating content-independent reason to 
act as directed, and (b) the obligating content-independent force of that directive 
would both defeat without being defeated by the obligating content-independent force 
of any countervailing directives that the members of group G might issue. 
In keeping with the simple view and the Razian account of authority, element (a) of 
the collectivist account holds that A has authority over a subject only if some of the 
directives it might issue would be obligating content-independent reasons for that subject. 
The core idea behind (b) is that a political authority characteristically has greater normative 
standing than the members of its public. That is, an institution has political authority only if 
the obligating content-independent force of at least some of its directives would defeat 
without being defeated by the obligating content-independent force of the countervailing 
directives that its public might issue. 
To help clarify the collectivist conception of preemption, consider that one business 
partner’s expressed wish that she and her fellow partners open up a Mexican restaurant 
might be an obligating content-independent reason for each of her fellow partners that 
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defeats without being reciprocally defeated by the obligating content-independent force of 
her counterparts’ expressed wishes that the partnership should sell hamburgers instead. If so, 
at least with respect to this one issue, the first partner would enjoy (collectivist) preeminent 
normative standing within the partnership. Perhaps, she is the sole general partner and the 
rest are limited partners. However, it could be that no partner’s expressed intention would 
be sufficient to defeat the combined obligating content-independent force of the other 
partners’ countervailing directives. In that case, although some partners might have greater 
say than other partners (e.g., there might be classes of senior and junior partners), no 
partner’s say would have preeminent normative standing within the group, and hence, no 
single partner’s say would be preemptive in the collectivist sense.  
In sum, (a) and (b) specify the collectivist account of the pretheoretical idea that an 
authoritative institution removes certain decisions about how the group as a whole should 
act. Note further that the idea of the scope of a political authority is implicit in this 
specification, particularly its claim that the directives of a political authority are obligating 
content-independent reasons. As noted above, an obligating content-independent reason is a 
substantial moral content-independent reason that, as such, is dispositive in a wide range of 
circumstances. The scope of a political authority is the set of circumstances in which its 
directives are both authoritative and dispositive. Hence, the scope of any political authority is 
partly a function of the force of the substantial moral grounds of its content-independent 
reasons, for this force determines the range of circumstances in which an authoritative 
directive is dispositive.  
For example, it could be that although a legislature’s property-rule specifying 
directives satisfy the collectivist conception, those directives would not be dispositive for, 
say, the bank teller who a gunman has ordered to empty the bank’s safe. In that case, the 
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bank teller’s substantial moral reason requiring her to act as directed by the legislature’s 
property rules would likely be defeated by the gunman’s clear and present threat to her well-
being. If so, the legislature’s authority would not encompass that set of circumstances. 
However, it would still be authoritative, for by dint of their substantial moral weight, its 
directives would be dispositive in a broad range of less dire circumstances. 
To clarify further the collectivist conception of authority and its appeal, consider that 
although (as discussed above) it is not clear why political institutions would insist that their 
directives are preemptive in the Razian sense, it is easy to explain why they would insist on 
collectivist preemption. Allen Buchanan puts his finger on the nub of this explanation.  
I have said that for institutions to achieve the coordination needed to provide their 
benefits, or at least to do so without unacceptable costs, they must have a certain 
standing, at least in the eyes of sufficiently large numbers of people—people who are 
in a position either to withhold cooperation or interfere with it.19  
As noted above, within most any political community, there is pervasive disagreement about 
the rights and duties of the community’s members. Hence, to sustain its capacity to secure its 
public’s conformity to its specifications of these rights and duties, the institution must 
provide its subjects with reasons to conform despite their inevitable objections to the merits 
of its rights-and-duty specifying directives. Buchanan’s first key point in the passage above is 
that generally, it is too costly for any institution to rely exclusively on sanctions and rewards 
to keep its public in line. Thus (and this is Buchanan’s second point), to preserve its capacity 
to coordinate, most any political institution must convince a significant subset of its public 
																																																								
19 Allen Buchanan, The Heart of Human Rights, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 184. 
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that it has a special standing that morally binds them to comply despite doubts about the 
merits of the institution’s directives.  
 Buchanan nowhere clarifies his insight about political authorities’ normative 
standing. That is, he does not explain what a public accepts when they accept that an 
institution has such standing. The simple view identifies one key element—i.e. the 
substantial moral content-independent force of political institutions’ directives, and the 
collectivist conception reveals an indispensable further element. To see this further element, 
consider first that in many contexts, an agent’s well-being would be profoundly affected by 
the actions of others. In such contexts, the affected agent’s directives (e.g. its requests or 
demands) are pro tanto obligating content-independent reasons for those others.  For 
example, as Darwall might put it, by dint of my dignity, my demand that you remove your 
foot from atop mine is a pro tanto reason in itself that requires you to accede to my demand.  
Now, consider further that in Darwall’s example, we are led to believe that only the 
well-being and, hence, dignity of the person underfoot is at stake. However, in many 
strategic contexts, the well-being of all parties is significantly affected by the actions of their 
strategic counterparts. In such contexts, the expressed intentions of all parties about how 
other members of the group ought to act are pro tanto obligating content-independent 
reasons for one another by dint of the equal moral importance of the well-being of each. 
Moreover, in such strategic contexts, there might very well be a cacophony of comparably 
weighty and conflicting obligating content-independent directives.  
The key point for present purposes is that in order for a political institution to 
sustain its capacity to coordinate, it must do more than convince a sufficient portion of its 
public that its directives are the pro tanto substantial moral content-independent reasons that 
the simple view describes, for then its directives would be lost in a sea of comparably 
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normatively forceful countervailing directives. Rather, to govern a group effectively, a 
political institution must convince a significant portion of that group that its obligating 
content-independent directives would defeat without being reciprocally defeated by the 
obligating content-independent force of the countervailing directives that the other members 
of the group might issue. That is, it must convince them that its directives are preemptive in 
the collectivist sense.  
In sum, the collectivist conception’s specification of the preemptive force of 
authoritative directives is also a specification of the preeminent normative standing such 
directives must have if they are to coordinate the members of most any contemporary 
political community. Thus, construed in accordance with the collectivist conception rather 
than the Razian account, the preemptive force of a political authority’s directives is not a 
morally unimportant complement to their obligating content-independent force. On the 
contrary, it is a highly important normative feature of authoritative directives—namely, their 
distinctive preeminent normative standing. In this same vein, it should be noted that a 
crucial defect of the simple view of political authority is its failure to reflect this highly 
important feature.  
.  
3  The Juridical Ground of Collectivist Authority 
The just described collectivist account of political authority invites a functionalist 
account of the grounds of political authority—i.e. a defense based in the authority’s ability to 
secure morally important forms of social coordination.20 In what follows, I explicate Kit 
																																																								
20 For recent functionalist defenses of political authority, though not necessarily under that 
name, see John Finnis (2011) Natural Law and Natural Rights, 2nd ed., Oxford: Oxford 
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Wellman’s sophisticated functionalist account, and I consider two key objections that A. 
John Simmons has marshaled against it. As I argue, Simmons’s objections are occasions to 
clarify the functionalist’s burden rather than decisive refutations of Wellman’s functionalism. 
By contrast, I argue that that the collectivist conception brings a third objection to the fore 
that calls for a significant amendment to rather than a restatement of Wellman’s defense. I 
refer to the resulting functionalist ground as the Normal Functionalist Justification Thesis 
(NFJT).  
 
3.1 A Restatement of Wellman’s Functionalist Defense of Political Authority  
Wellman observes that contemporary states perform the important task of rescuing 
their publics from the perils of the state of nature. He argues that because and insofar as 
issuing and enforcing its laws is the necessary means by which any such state effects this 
rescue, it is justified in doing so.21 Thus, Wellman advances a functionalist argument in 
support of states’ political legitimacy that rests on what he describes as a samaritan duty of 
rescue. Wellman further argues that such samaritan duties of rescue are key elements of the 
justification of the state’s political authority.  
As I see it, Wellman’s samaritan-based defense of political authority rests on four 
main premises. First, the state’s capacity to rescue its public can only be sustained by dint of 
																																																																																																																																																																					
University Press, 246; David Copp (1999) “The Idea of a Legitimate State”, Philosophy and 
Public Affairs 28: 3-45; Christopher Wellman (2001); David Lefkowtiz (2005) “A 
Contractualist Defense of Democratic Authority”, Ratio Juris 18: 346-64; Annie Stilz (2011) 
“Nations, States, and Territory”, Ethics 121: 572-601, and Enoch (2014) 20-22. 
21 Wellman (2001), 747-50. 
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its public’s general conformity to its directives. Second, each member of any such public is 
morally bound by a positive samaritan duty to contribute to the collective effort that realizes 
this important benefit of rescue from the state of nature.22  Crucially, Wellman concedes that 
rarely would any single citizen’s failure to obey the law undercut the state’s ability to effect 
the rescue of its citizenry. Hence, he acknowledges that the samaritan duty of rescue alone 
does not bind citizens to obey the laws of their state.23 For this reason, Wellman appeals to a 
third premise which holds that the principle of fairness requires each citizen to contribute 
her fair share to the collective effort that sustains the state’s ability to rescue its citizens from 
the state of nature. In Wellman’s words: 
By invoking fairness in this fashion, we may freely admit that no one would slip into 
peril if a single individual disobeyed the law. Instead, we point out that it would be 
unfair to shirk one’ s share of the samaritan chore. Securing political stability is a 
communal responsibility that falls upon all of us; it is wrong to leave all the work to 
others.24  
Wellman’s fourth premise is that the fair contribution to this communal chore is conformity 
to the state’s just laws. In sum, Wellman concludes that a samaritan duty of rescue 
supplemented by a principle of fairness requires citizens to obey the state’s just laws.25 
A. John Simmons marshals two formidable objections to Wellman’s argument. The 
first is as follows: 
																																																								
22 Id.  
23 Id.  
24 Id. 749. 
25 Id.  
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It makes sense to speak of an individual owing a fair share of some task, in my view, 
only if that individual is morally bound to some group or collective entity and its 
enterprises. Others cannot demand of me that I do my part unless I actually have a 
part in some scheme or enterprise to which I am bound.26  
I take it that Simmons’s point is that persons might devote their finite resources to any of a 
number of highly important collective efforts and that the communal project of rescuing 
fellow citizens from the perils of the state of nature is just one of them. Hence, no one is 
morally required to participate in this collective effort; rather, each is morally permitted to 
devote their finite resources to this or some other effort of comparable moral importance. In 
sum, Simmons denies Wellman’s claim that sustaining the state’s capacity is a morally 
mandatory collective effort for the state’s citizens. That is, Simmons denies that the state’s citizens 
are morally required to contribute to this communal chore. 
 Simmons’s second objection grants for the sake of argument that the communal 
chore of rescuing one’s fellow citizens from the perils of the state of nature is morally 
mandatory. However, it challenges Wellman’s further claim that fairness requires each citizen 
to contribute to this effort by obeying the state’s directives.27 As Simmons puts this point in 
one passage: 
But the good my obedience is supposed to provide to others, remember, is the good 
of security. And it is not at all clear that such a good could not be provided for 
another by means other than legal obedience. Since the number of persons needing 
																																																								
26 See A. John Simmons and Christopher Wellman (2005) Is There a Duty to Obey the Law?, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 185-186. 
27 Id. at 187.  
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security is at worst three or four times greater than the number duty-bound to help 
provide it, my fair share of helping to provide security could be done by providing 
security for, say, myself and two or three others. (187) 
A tempting rejoinder to Simmons’s objection is that should any community heed 
Simmons’s suggestion and dissolve into small groups, each concerned solely with ensuring 
the security of its members, it would thereby soon find itself in the perilous context of 
strategic interaction that worried Hobbes. More pointedly, so the rejoinder goes, Simmons’s 
objection illustrates the importance of public settlements—i.e. practices in which by and large 
the members of a community (i) conform to the same set of norms and (ii) they are all aware 
of (or are at least positioned to learn readily) the content of those norms and the fact that 
their fellow community members generally conform to them. That is, Simmons’s objection 
illustrates the point that Kant, Hobbes, Locke, and many other theorists have made. Namely, 
to avoid the perils of the state of nature, persons who regularly interact with one another 
must reliably observe a number of publicly settled frameworks of rights, powers, duties, and 
so on.  
For illustrative purposes, consider that two oft-discussed publicly settled frameworks 
of rights are those that regulate the use of external objects (i.e. property rights) and those 
that specify the conditions in which force may be used against the community’s members 
(e.g., criminal law and procedure). The core functionalist idea is that unless frameworks of 
rights of the sort just described are publicly settled, then different camps will follow and 
apply distinct and potentially conflicting norms that guide them in the use of force and their 
judgments about what belongs to whom. In such a context, the members of such a 
community would find it difficult to predict either what resources they could use without 
fearing the interventions of others or when others might use force against them.  
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As a Hobbesian-minded theorist would emphasize, the just described 
unpredictability and disagreement would lead to widespread diffidence of one another and, 
hence, to pervasive physical insecurity, anxiety, and violence. Publicly settling these norms 
undercuts this vicious Hobbesian logic, thereby holding the promise of significantly 
advancing the security interests of all members of the community. Moreover, as a Kantian-
mind theorist would emphasize, such settlements also further fundamental agency interests, 
for without the predictability and security they facilitate, the realization of many long-term 
personal plans of paramount moral importance would be impossible. Moreover, the 
enormous productive potential of cooperative endeavors that rely on such predictability and 
security would remain untapped. 28 
 Tempting as it is, the foregoing rejoinder misses Simmons’s point, for Simmons’s 
objection presupposes a context in which the state has by and large secured the public 
settlements requisite for the realization of the fundamental security and agency interests 
described above. Moreover, it presupposes, as Wellman concedes, that no single individual’s 
violation will undercut the state’s capacity to rescue its citizens from the state of nature.29 
Simmons’s challenge then is as follows: If no individual’s deviation from the state-secured 
public settlement would undercut that settlement, then why does the principle of fairness 
forbid the individual from discharging her obligation to contribute to the interests the public 
settlement serves in some way other than strictly conforming to the settlement—say, 
focusing on the security needs of three or four. 
																																																								
28 See e.g., Stilz (2011) and Arthur Ripstein (2009) “Force and Freedom” Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press. 
29 See Wellman (2001), 749. 
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Taken together, Simmons’s two objections reveal that the key axis of debate between 
the functionalist statist and the philosophical anarchist is whether and to what extent the 
subject of any extant political institution must contribute to morally mandatory collective 
efforts by strictly conforming to the terms of public settlements secured and specified by a 
political institution’s directives. To put the issue a bit more concisely, the key point of debate 
is whether any institution satisfies the following Simple Functionalist Condition.  
(SFC) The political institution’s issuance of directives has secured or would be likely 
to secure the realization of a morally mandatory public settlement for a group in 
accordance with those directives. 
The functionalist argues that many extant political institutions satisfy (SFC), for at least some 
of their directives (perhaps, those specifying the community’s property regime or regulating 
the use of force) specify and secure the terms of a group’s morally mandatory public settlement—
i.e. a public settlement the terms of which the members of the group are morally required to 
observe.  
Viewed through the lens of (SFC), Wellman argues that although no one would slip 
into peril if a single individual violated the terms of a state-specified public settlement that 
rescued a community from the state of nature, it would be unfair for any citizen to violate 
the terms of such a settlement. Wellman’s key claim is that maintaining such public 
settlements is a communal moral chore that is equally incumbent on all members of a 
political community. Hence, any citizen who might deviate from that settlement would 
thereby unfairly and, hence, wrongly free ride on her fellow citizens’ settlement-maintaining 
compliance.  
A key point that Wellman and, a fortiori, Simmons seem to overlook is that the 
principle of fairness is not the only consideration that might ground a weighty moral 
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requirement to conform strictly to the public settlements that a political institution’s 
directives secure. To wit, the fundamental agency and security interests that many public 
settlements secure are also grounds of this sort, for in many cases, particular violations of a 
public settlement would immediately and significantly set back these interests.  
For example, I might use something that the regnant property settlement has 
awarded to you. I might take a significant sum of money from you or occupy an apartment 
that the settlement deems yours. In so doing, I would upset your long-term plans that relied 
on the public settlement. I would also upset the plans of others that relied on your having 
access to the money or the exclusive use of your property. Thus, I would significantly set 
back your and others’ fundamental agency interests. I would also set back the security 
interests of many, for now, the chances that force will be used to resolve this issue go up 
tremendously. Moreover, if my actions are done openly, they are likely to provoke fears and 
uncertainty in others about their physical security and the predictability of their social 
environment.   
No doubt, not all violations of public settlements would directly set back 
fundamental agency and security interest.  For example, the undetected tax cheat might not 
directly set back anyone’s agency interests. And, I might not set these interests back by 
surreptitiously using your apartment while you are away on a business trip or by ignoring the 
proverbial stop sign inexplicably placed on a little travelled desert road. However, very many 
deviations from such settlements would directly set back fundamental agency and security 
interests in the ways described above Insofar as they would, persons are bound by a 
defeasible moral requirement to conform strictly to the settlement’s terms.  
Yet a fourth ground of a moral requirement to conform strictly to the terms of a 
public settlement is suggested by a number of theorists’ broadly similar accounts of a key 
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underlying value of democratic governance.30 Above, I endorsed the first premise of these 
theorists’ account of this underlying value. This premise holds that with respect to terms of 
social interaction that have significant and comparable implications for the well-being of 
each member of a group, the say of each member of that group has equal normative 
standing. Accordingly, so these theorists argue, the specification of such terms should not be 
determined in a way that gives some members of the group greater say than others. On this 
basis, these theorists conclude that a key underlying value of democratic decision-making 
procedures is that they enable the group to specify the terms of such morally important 
social interactions in a way that accords equal say to each. More pointedly, by violating the 
democratically enacted terms, the relevant group’s members would thereby modify the terms 
of social interactions in a way that does not give each an equal say.  
In accordance with the foregoing account of the value of democratic governance, we 
might argue as follows: By failing to conform to a democratic institution’s public settlement 
of terms of social interaction that have significant and roughly comparable implications for 
each member of the institution’s public, any member of that public who did not conform to 
the terms of that settlement would thereby setback the underlying values of democratic 
governance. Put in David Lefkowtiz’s terms, she would thereby wrong others by unilaterally 
imposing on them her conclusions regarding what morality requires, thereby failing to 
acknowledge the exercise of moral judgment by others and displaying moral immodesty and 
incivility.31  
																																																								
30 See e.g., Lefkowtiz (2005); Christiano (2008) and Daniel Viehoff (2014) “Democratic 
Equality and Political Authority”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 42: 337-375, 369. 
31 See Lefkowtiz (2005), 364.  
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A crucial point to note is that all four grounds canvassed above are defeasible. That 
is, the terms of a public settlement might be so morally egregious that it would be 
permissible or required to violate them even though by doing so, one would set back the 
values of democratic civility, fairness, agency, or security. That said, to the extent that these 
values are not defeated and individual violations of the terms of a public settlement would 
set them back, these values ground a morally mandatory public settlement. In other words, 
the foregoing values (and perhaps others not canvassed here) are grounds of a defeasible 
juridical duty to conform strictly to public settlements.  
To be clear, my goal here is not to settle decisively the debate between the 
functionalist apologist for political authority and the anarchist. Rather, it is to clarify the 
terms of the debate and to emphasize that the functionalist has more resources than 
Wellman or his anarchist interlocutors seems to recognize. In short, the functionalist’s 
burden is to establish that some public settlements are to a significant extent morally 
mandatory. And, the core functionalist intuition is that significantly setting back values of the 
sort just described is a profound moral wrong, and hence, these values have the potential to 
ground highly expansive though not unlimited claims to political authority.  
 
3.2 The Collectivist Modification of Wellman’s Functionalism 
 The collectivist conception brings to the fore yet a third objection that calls for a 
significant amendment to Wellman’s defense of political authority. To see this objection, 
consider first that a number of critics have argued that functionalist defenses of authority 
specify considerations that would justify acting as a political institution directs, but they do 
not specify considerations that would justify acting as the institution directs for the reason 
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that it so directs.32 That is, these critics have argued that functionalist defenses fail to furnish 
grounds of the content-independent force of authoritative directives. To illustrate by 
reference to the SFC, this criticism holds that although an institution’s public would have 
reason to conform to the institution’s directives that secure and specify the terms of a 
morally mandatory public settlement, it would not be a content-independent reason. That is, 
their reason to act as directed would be that they must do so to conform to the terms of a 
morally mandatory settlement, but it would not be the fact that the institution has so 
directed.  
Although correct as far as it goes, the foregoing line of criticism does not identify the 
key problem with extant functionalist defenses of political authority. To see why, consider 
first that obligating content-independent reasons are commonplace. For example, legislative 
enactments are issued by persons, legislators, whose well-being is significantly affected by 
many of the enactments that they endorse. Thus, establishing the obligating content-
independent force an institution’s directives is not the difficult task. Rather, the difficult task 
is to identify grounds of the preeminent obligating content-independent force of an 
institution’s directives vis-à-vis countervailing directives. More carefully stated, then, the key 
shortcoming of extant functionalist defenses of political authority, including (SFC), is that 
they do not specify considerations that would, per the collectivist conception of authority, 
ground the preeminent obligating content-independent force of authoritative directives. 
																																																								
32 See e.g., Donald Regan “Authority and Value: Reflections on Raz’s Morality of Freedom”, 
(1989) University of Southern California Law Review: 62: 995-1094,1021-32. Also some passages 
from Simmons are suggestive of this objection. See e.g., Simmons and Wellman (2005), 188.  
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 To meet this third objection, I add a second element to SFC. The resulting 
functionalist account of the grounds of political authority holds as follows: 
The Normal Functionalist Justification Thesis (The NFJT). The normal way to 
establish that an institution has (collectivist) political authority over a public is to 
show that:  
(1) The political institution’s issuance of directives has secured or would be likely to 
secure the realization of a morally mandatory public settlement for a group in 
accordance with those directives, and; 
(2) All things considered, the political institution’s issuance of those directives is 
better than any alternative feasible modality for that group to realize that 
settlement.  
(1) needs no further explanation, for it just restates (SFC); however, (2) introduces the idea 
of an all things considered better modality and the idea of a feasible alternative modality that 
do.  
Any number of factors might figure in the all things considered assessment of 
modalities that (2) specifies. Here I enumerate three that are particularly important.  The first 
is an institution’s deliberative competence, which refers to the quality of the public 
settlement (e.g., the justice or efficiency of the terms it specifies) that the institution is likely 
to implement. A second is the democratic or representative quality of the decision-making 
procedures that lead to the specification of the public settlement. To see yet a third measure, 
consider that the members of certain ethnic groups might rarely occupy the highest 
governmental offices in a given community, and hence, they might experience a sense of 
alienation from the community’s governing institutions despite its high levels of deliberative 
competence and democratic pedigree. All things being equal, the better modality of public 
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settlement alienates the relevant public the least. In sum, whether one modality of securing a 
group’s morally mandatory public settlements is better than another turns on the balance of 
a wide variety of comparative considerations of the sort that I have just described. 
An alternative modality is feasible for a group only if, given the relevant institutional, 
political and sociological facts, that modality would be able to secure and specify the relevant 
public settlements were it not for the interventions of the regnant modality. Although there 
are difficult borderline cases, there are also clear examples of feasible alternatives. To name 
one, in many instances, were it not for the intervention of the Supreme Court, the U.S. 
Congress’s directives rather than the Court’s rulings would specify and secure certain aspects 
of a public settlement for the American community. In such instances, the U.S. Congress is a 
feasible alternative modality for the American community’s realization of the public 
settlement.  
By contrast, it might be that although democratic institutions would in principle be 
the all things considered best modality for securing a community’s morally mandatory public 
settlements, sociological and political realities (e.g. perhaps the community is riven by ethnic 
and religious strife) might preclude the near term possibility of democratic governance for 
that community. In that case, the democratic modality of securing public settlements would 
not be feasible. Moreover, the regnant non-democratic modality would satisfy (2) so long as 
its implementation of those settlements did not impede the emergence of the democratic 
modality or any other better modality.  
Note further that alternative modalities need not be institutional. For example, it 
might be that were it not for the interventions of the legislature, certain public settlements 
might be specified and secured by way of customary practice.  However, for any number of 
reasons, a community might be unable to sustain the relevant public settlement in this way, 
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and in that case, this modality would not be a feasible alternative modality for securing that 
settlement.   
With the foregoing details in hand, I can now explain why an institution that satisfies  
the NFJT would enjoy the preeminent normative standing specified by the collectivist 
conception. The core idea is that if an institution is better than any feasible alternative 
modality of specifying and securing its public’s realization of a morally mandatory public 
settlement, then by conforming to that institution’s public-settlement specifying directives, 
the members of its public would sustain the community’s capacity to secure its morally 
mandatory public settlements by way of the best feasible modality. More pointedly, by failing 
to conform, they would thereby immediately set back this ability. In sum, insofar as an 
institution satisfies the NFJT, the obligating content-independent force of at least some of 
the directives of such an institution would be preeminent, for the members of the relevant 
public must follow its directives rather than the terms specified by any other person or 
institution in order to sustain and avoid setting back their community’s capacity to realize 
public settlements via the best feasible modality.  
 
4. The Implausibility of the Razian Account of Authority 
I argue in this section that the Razian conception of authority leads to perverse 
implications about the scope of institutions’ political authority. The key point that I hope to 
establish is that these perverse implications are emblematic of a deeper and fatal flaw of the 
Razian analysis of authority. Namely, the Razian account mistakenly characterizes 
preemption and political authority as a dyadic relationship between the authority and the 
individual subject rather than an irreducibly collectivist relationship. Thus, the Razian 
account misguidedly directs the theorist to considerations that would ground the 
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individualistic form of relationship, and it defines the limits of political authority on the basis 
of those considerations. To make this case, I discuss the Razian account of functionalist and 
democratic bases of political authority. 
 
4.1 Functionalist Considerations and the Justification of Razian Political Authority 
 In a number of passages, Raz states that the need to secure important forms of social 
coordination is one of two key factors most relevant to the justification of political authority. 
The other is the political authority’s expertise.33 Some of Raz’s earliest discussions of the 
functionalist ground and expertise suggest that the former is a distinct and independent 
ground of authority. To wit, Raz writes:  
Authority can secure co-ordination only if the individuals concerned defer to its 
judgment and do not act on the balance of reasons but on the authority’s 
instructions. This guarantees that all will participate in one plan of action, that action 
will be co-ordinated.34  
In this passage, Raz seems to argue that an authority can secure the social coordination of its 
subjects only if such subjects accept the exclusionary force of its directives. Hence, given the 
importance of securing such coordination, the subjects of such an authority must accept the 
exclusionary force of its directives. However, this functionalist defense of Razian authority is 
deeply implausible. To see why, consider again a legislature’s public settlement of a 
framework of rights, such as the regime of property rights discussed above.  
																																																								
33 See Joseph Raz (2006) “The Problem of Authority, 153; (1990) Practical Reasons and Norms, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 64, and (1986), 75. 
34 Raz (1990), 64. 
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Public settlements of a community’s property rights are coordinated actions in Raz’s 
sense, for they are realized only insofar as the members of the relevant public conform to 
the very same set of norms, or, in Raz’s terms, one plan of action. Accordingly, the just 
described functionalist argument for authority would fail if, contrary to Raz’s key premise, 
communities could sustain such settlements even though few or none of its members 
accepted the exclusionary force of the relevant institution’s directives. Because it is very 
likely that many such public settlements have been maintained largely by dint of 
considerations other than the perceived exclusionary force of an institution’s directives, 
including fear of sanction and the belief that fairness or other moral considerations require 
conformity, the functionalist defense set out in the passage above is highly dubious.  
The foregoing criticism of Raz’s functionalist defense of authority is not meant to be 
completely novel, for Leslie Green has advanced similar objections.35 Moreover, in response 
to these objections, Raz has clarified his claims about the connection between a community’s 
need to coordinate and the exclusionary force of the directives that secure such 
coordination, now arguing that the need to secure coordination in tandem with other 
considerations grounds (Razian) political authority. As he puts the point: 
 [I]f the person or organization is less likely to be biased than I am and if they have 
greater expertise than I concerning the goods and social needs for which 
coordination may be needed, and the ways of achieving them. In such a case I should 
adopt a rule to follow the instructions of such a person or body, to regard them as 																																																								
35 Green develops this argument at length in his (1985) “Authority and Convention”, 35 
Philosophical Quarterly 329 and (1983) “Law, Co­ordination and the Common Good, 3 Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 299. 
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authorities, within certain specified bounds.36  
Thus, Raz argues that it is not the mere need to achieve important forms of social 
coordination that grounds the exclusionary force of the state’s directives. Rather, it is the 
imperative to coordinate at the appropriate time and the best way possible combined with 
the relative deliberative superiority of the state with respect to such matters that grounds the 
exclusionary force of states’ directives, and hence their (Razian) political authority. 37  
To see the perverse implication of Raz’s hybrid functionalist and expertise-based 
account of the grounds of political authority, consider Raz’s acknowledgment that authority 
as he construes it is piecemeal, meaning that an authority’s directives might very well be 
authoritative with respect to some but not all the subjects the authority purports to govern. 
To use Raz’s illustrative example, laws regulating the use of certain drugs might be 
exclusionary reasons for some of a state’s citizens by dint of the state’s superior deliberative 
competence with respect to the reasons relevant to the proper usage of the regulated drugs. 
However, the exclusionary force of such directives might not extend to all its citizens, 
perhaps, those who are pharmacologists or doctors, for the pertinent deliberative 
competence of these citizens might very well equal or exceed the state’s.38  
Now, consider the legislature whose enactments publicly settle a community’s 
framework of property rights. Moreover, for the sake of argument grant that the legislature 
satisfies the NFJT. If so, then, as I have argued above, the legislature’s directives would have 																																																								
36 Joseph Raz (1989) “Facing Up: A Reply”, University of Southern California Law Review 62: 
1153-1226, 1192.  
37 See also Raz (2010), 153 for a recent condensed statement of this argument. 
38 See Raz (1986), 74. 
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preeminent normative standing within the relevant political community, for all things 
considered, it would be better than any feasible alternative modality for securing and 
specifying a morally mandatory public settlement for the group (the group’s settled 
framework of property rights). Nonetheless, per Raz’s amended argument, such a legislature 
would not necessarily have political authority. On this account, to establish the legislature’s 
authority over any subject, the theorist must further show that the legislature is less likely to 
be biased than the subject or that it has greater expertise than the subject does concerning 
the goods and social needs for which the public settlement of the community’s framework 
of property rights is needed. Thus, it might be, per Raz’s amended argument, that the NJFT-
satisfying legislature’s has authority over non-experts like you and me, but not say, Jeremy 
Waldron or Richard Epstein.  
The foregoing conclusion is deeply implausible. Moreover, it is an implausibility that 
is emblematic of the fundamental flaw in Raz’s conception of authority. Namely, the Razian 
account mistakenly characterizes authority as a relationship in which the authority’s 
directives discharge the deliberative function for each individual subject rather than the 
group as a whole. As a result, it misguidedly defines the limits of such authority in terms of 
considerations that would justify the authority’s performance of a deliberative function for 
an individual rather than for the group as whole.  
 In response to the foregoing criticism, a Razian theorist might note that expertise 
and lesser bias are not the only grounds of the exclusionary force of an institution’s 
directives. For example, David Enoch has recently refined and extended Raz’s claim that 
avoiding anxiety and the expenditure of finite cognitive resources is an important basis of 
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exclusionary reasons (more precisely, for Enoch, quasi-exclusionary reasons).39 However, 
identifying such further grounds of exclusionary reasons only reinforces rather than 
undercuts the key criticism of the Razian account, for the boundaries of authority that they 
imply are no less perverse. To wit, the grounds that Enoch discusses would imply that the 
authority of the NJFT-satisfying legislature discussed above would extend to those that have 
reason not to devote cognitive resources to considering the merits of the community’s 
property laws, but not, say, those that enjoy and perform a public service by doing so.   
 
4.2 The Democratic Basis of Razian Authority 
To see an instructive variant of this same criticism, consider that a number of 
theorists working with the Razian framework have argued that the values underlying 
democratic governance ground the exclusionary force and, hence, the authority of political 
institutions.  Daniel Viehoff recently has offered a sophisticated argument in support of this 
claim based in the value that he describes as nonsubjection.40  
For Viehoff, one person subjects others if she has greater power than her 
counterparts to determine the terms of her social interactions with them, and she exercises 
that power, thereby (as Lefkowitz would put it) imposing her moral judgment on others. 
Viehoff adds: 
Unless the disputants set aside the considerations of greater and lesser power that 
they otherwise take into account in determining how best to advance justice or the 
common good, they cannot hope to realize nonsubjection in their relationship. So 
																																																								
39 See id., 75 and Enoch (2014). 
40 Viehoff (2014), 369. 
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the concern for nonsubjection explains the exclusionary demands of the directive.41 
Thus, he argues that the value of nonsubjection requires more than refraining from acting in 
ways that taking advantage of one’s great power. It further requires not acting for certain 
reasons—namely, those that favor acting in ways that would take advantage of one’s greater 
power.  
For example, on Viehoff’s account, the value of nonsubjection would require the 
citizen not only to conform to a democratically enacted term of social cooperation, say, the 
requirement to pay a certain amount in taxes. Moreover, it would further require the citizen 
to exclude from her consideration at least some of the reasons, perhaps the minor injustice 
of paying the tax or the prudential benefits of not paying the tax, that favor exercising her 
unilateral power to modify the terms of social interaction (i.e. her ability to cheat on her 
taxes without getting caught). 
I am not convinced by this argument, for I do not see why placing appropriate first 
order weight on the value of nonsubjection and acting accordingly would not be enough to 
pay full homage to that value. For example, I don’t see why the citizen who takes the minor 
injustice of paying a certain tax into consideration when deliberating about whether to pay 
the tax would thereby fail to heed the value of nonsubjection. To my mind, she would pay 
full homage to this value if she rightly concluded that the value of nonsubjection requires her 
to pay the tax despite its minor injustice and for that reason paid the tax.   
To be clear, refuting Viehoff is not the primary objective of the foregoing discussion. 
Rather, I voice doubts about his argument to illustrate the following point. Namely, from the 
Razian perspective, whether Viehoff has identified grounds of political authority turns on 
																																																								
41 Id. 369. 
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whether he is right and I am wrong about the exclusionary force of the value of non-
subjection. However, it is implausible that the existence and scope of the authority of 
democratic institutions hinges on the outcome of such an arcane dispute. Moreover, this 
implausibility is emblematic of the deeper failing of the Razian account described above. 
Namely, this account defines the scope of political authority in terms of considerations that 
are relevant to whether the authority would be justified in performing a deliberative function 
for an individual rather than a group as a whole.  
 
5. The Promise of the Collectivist Conception of Authority 
In this section, I recapitulate some of the key features of the collectivist account of 
the structure and ground of authority that I have defended here. I do this both to clarify this 
conception and to highlight its appeal and promise. In service of this latter objective, I also 
briefly discuss two oft-discussed issues in legal and political philosophy that the collectivist 
conception reframes.   
 
5.1 Key Features of the Collectivist Conception 
I have argued that the simple view of political authority problematically fails to 
reflect the preemptive force of authoritative directives and the Razian account mistakenly 
construes preemption in individualistic rather than collectivist terms. In this same vein, I 
have argued that both the simple view and the Razian account fail to appreciate that political 
authorities characteristically claim that that their directives have a preeminent normative 
standing. As a result, neither account recognizes that the scope and limits of authority are 
determined by considerations that would justify this standing.  
 I have further argued that The Normal Functionalist Justification Thesis specifies 
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the conditions in which a political institution would possess the preeminent normative 
standing distinctive of political authority. In summary, this thesis holds that if an institution 
is all things considered better than any alternative feasible modality for specifying and 
securing the terms of a group’s morally mandatory public settlement, then it has political 
authority over that group.  
Note that two distinct civic obligations are implicit in the NFJT: the juridical duty to 
conform strictly to the terms of a morally mandatory public settlement, and the political 
obligation to conform to the directives of an institution that secures and specifies the terms 
of such a settlement.  As discussed above, two distinct categories are relevant to the scope of 
individuals’ juridical duties. The first category includes values, such as fairness, democratic 
civility, agency, and security. Values within this first category morally bind individuals to 
public settlements; hence, I refer to them as juridical values. The second category comprises 
ideals of political morality, such as justice, that are the fundamental standards for assessing 
the moral quality of public settlements (e.g., settled frameworks of property rights). I have 
argued that the juridical values ground a defeasible moral requirement to conform strictly to 
the terms of certain public settlements and that a settlement’s failure to realize certain highly 
important ideals of political morality are potential defeaters of that duty. As discussed above, 
a core functionalist intuition is that by dint of the weight of juridical values, such as 
democratic civility, agency, security, and fairness, the juridical duty to conform to certain 
public settlements might be dispositive even with respect to deeply flawed (e.g., significantly 
but not egregiously unjust) terms of those settlements.  
The scope of the second civic obligation, the duty to obey certain political 
institutions’ directives is determined by the balance of the two categories of values just 
described and yet a third category of values. As discussed above, this third category 
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comprises values that are relevant to the assessment of the comparative quality of alternative 
modalities for securing public settlements (e.g., democratic pedigree, deliberative 
competence, and the degree to which its public identifies with it). In sum, I have argued that 
an institution’s public is bound by a political obligation to obey that institution’s directives 
(or, in other words, the institution has political authority over that public) insofar as (1) by 
dint of juridical values, its directives specify and secure public settlements that are morally 
mandatory for its public, (2) the juridical values are not defeated by ideals of political 
morality that militate against compliance with those settlements, and (3) all things 
considered, the institution is better than any alternative feasible modality of specifying and 
securing the settlements. 
 
5.2 The Collectivist Conception, Judicial Decision-Making, and the Particularity Requirement 
As Raz has noted, a distinctive feature of the courts of any legal system is that they 
are norm-applying rather than discretionary organs.42 That is, courts apply norms that they 
take to be authoritative to decide cases and rely on their own independent deliberative lights 
only when the authoritative norms are not dispositive. The collectivist suggests a novel and, 
as I hope the reader will agree, perspicuous account of what it is for a norm to be an 
authoritative basis of judicial decisions. Namely, in addition to providing the relevant judicial 
officials with an obligating content-independent reason to decide cases in accordance with 
the norm, the obligating content-independent force of such norms defeat without being 
reciprocally defeated by the content-independent force of any countervailing norms. 
																																																								
42 See Raz (1979), 107-11. 
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Moreover, to be an authoritative basis of a particular legal decision, the norm also must not 
be defeated by any other countervailing considerations given the facts of the case at hand.  
In this same vein, the NFJT is a promising guide for judicial inquiry into the identity 
and content of the authoritative norms that courts must apply to decide cases. To see this 
point, consider first that judicial officials confront a vast sea of candidate authoritative 
norms, for there are myriad potential sources of such norms, including customary practices, 
courts, legislatures, and administrative bodies at municipal, provincial, federal, international, 
and transnational levels. Thus, courts face the task of determining which of these candidate 
norms are authoritative. Moreover, they must consider whether to strike a balance between 
competing sources of putatively authoritative norms, be it by way of a hierarchical ranking of 
the sources, a division of domains of authority by subject matter or territorial jurisdiction, an 
interpretive integration of the directives issued by the competing sources, or some 
combination of these and perhaps other ways of striking a balance.43  
A felicitous feature of the collectivist conception is that the NFJT, suitably modified, 
provides guidance for courts in the just described tasks. That is, it instructs courts to decide 
cases on the basis of norms that have been specified by the best feasible modality for 
specifying the morally mandatory public settlements at issue. In this same spirit, it instructs 
courts to rank and integrate potentially competing modalities of public settlements in the 
																																																								
43 See Nicole Roughan (2013) Authoritites, Oxford: Oxford University Press for an extended 
discussion of how authoritative labor might be shared between institutions. Moreover, she 
offers an account of authority that promises to provide guidance for allocating the division 
of authoritative labor. See also Anthony Reeves (2015) “Political Reasons and Legality: 
Instrumental Political Authority without Exclusion,” Law and Philosophy 34: 257-98. 
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way that would constitute the best possible overarching modality of specifying and securing 
the relevant communities morally mandatory public settlements.   
A second noteworthy implication of the collectivist account pertains to the storied 
particularity requirement. In the words of A. John Simmons, any defense of political 
authority must: 
be able to explain why the moral duty (or obligation) to obey is owed specially to one 
particular society (or to its subjects or governors) above all others (namely, to “our 
own” societies), rather than offering only some moral reason for obedience that 
would bind one equally or more imperatively to obey or support the laws or political 
institutions of other societies.44  
On the basis of this requirement, Simmons rejects a number of accounts of the grounds of 
political authority. For example, he argues that accounts that appeal to a natural duty to 
support just institutions fail because they justify supporting any just institution rather than 
one’s own political institutions in particular.45  
A number of theorists are unmoved by the particularity requirement, arguing in 
essence that it reflects an ahistorical and parochial prejudice about the nature of political 
authority.46 I am sympathetic to this objection; however, I also feel the particularity 
requirement’s intuitive appeal, as others must as well given the prominence of this line of 
																																																								
44 Simmons and Wellman (2005), 166. 
45 See Simmons and Wellman (2005), 167-79. 
46 See e.g., Kevin Walton (2013) “The Particularities of Legitimacy: John Simmons on 
Political Obligation,” Ratio Juris 26: 1-15, 10-12. 
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argument. A felicitous feature of the collectivist conception is that it preserves the 
particularity requirement’s kernel of non-parochial truth.  
Like the particularity requirement, the collectivist conception holds that the members 
of a political authority’s public have a special duty to obey that authority over and above 
others. To wit, the collectivist conception holds that the members of an authority’s public 
have greater reason to conform to the say of the authority than they have to conform to the 
say of any other member of the public. Hewing yet more closely to Simmons’s particularity 
requirement, the collectivist conception allows for the possibility that some political 
authorities might be supreme within their domain of authority. That is, the directives of 
some authorities might be obligating content-independent reasons for the members of their 
public that would defeat without being defeated by the obligating content-independent 
reasons that any other person or institution might issue, be they a member of the authority’s 
public or not. 
However, unlike Simmons’s formulation of the particularity requirement, the 
collectivist conception is not unduly parochial, for it allows that the best all things 
considered feasible modalities for securing and specifying morally mandatory settlements for 
a public might include institutions that are not the public’s own. For example, the collectivist 
conception allows that the tax laws of the United States could be supremely authoritative for 
citizens of other countries across a wide range of circumstances (e.g., when those citizens 
have significant business dealings in the U.S. or with companies located in the U.S.). Or, to 
give a second example, the collectivist conception allows that directives issued by 
international institutions, e.g., human rights law, could be supremely authoritative for U.S. 
citizens and officials.  
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In sum, in addition to illustrating the collectivist conception’s non-parochial focus, 
the discussions of the particularity requirement and the authoritative bases of judicial 
decisions illuminate two further important features. First, the collectivist conception is 
modular. That is, it allows for the possibility that different political institutions might be 
authoritative with respect to the same public or overlapping publics, where such authority 
might be divided in various ways (e.g., hierarchically, by subject matter, or interpretative 
integration).  Second, the collectivist conception promises to guide legal officials in their 
efforts to integrate and distribute authoritative labor among modalities of public settlement, 
and similarly, it promises to assist theorists in determining whether and to what extent any 
extant political institutions, such as legislatures, courts, administrative bodies, international 
institutions, and so on are authoritative, be it singly or in combination with other modalities 
of public settlements. 
 
Conclusion 
Here, I have defended the collectivist conception of the structure of political 
authority and its juridical ground, the NFJT, and I have argued against the simple and the 
Razian account of political authority. I hope these arguments are convincing, but even if not, 
perhaps one important point would remain. Namely, the analysis of the distinctive 
preemptive normative character of authoritative directives has far-reaching implications for 
further inquiry into the authority of political institutions. Hence, developing and considering 
alternatives to Raz’s analysis of preemption is an important and yet surprisingly neglected 
task.  
 
